巴菲特1987年致股东的信（英文版）

以下是 1987 年巴菲特致股东的信英文版全文：

To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:

Our gain in net worth during 1987 was $464 million, or 19.5%. Over the last 23 years (that is, since present management took over), our per - share book value has grown from $19.46 to $2,477.47, or at a rate of 23.1% compounded annually.

What counts, of course, is the rate of gain in per - share business value, not book value. In many cases, a corporation's book value and business value are almost totally unrelated. For example, just before they went bankrupt, LTV and Baldwin - United published year - end audits showing their book values to be $652 million and $397 million, respectively. Conversely, Belridge Oil was sold to Shell in 1979 for $3.6 billion although its book value was only $177 million. At Berkshire, however, the two valuations have tracked rather closely, with the growth rate in business value over the last decade moderately outpacing the growth rate in book value. This good news continued in 1987.

Our premium of business value to book value has widened for two simple reasons: we own some remarkable businesses and they are run by even more remarkable managers. You have a right to question that second assertion. After all, CEOs seldom tell their shareholders that they have assembled a bunch of turkeys to run things. Their reluctance to do so makes for some strange annual reports. Oftentimes, in his shareholders' letter, a CEO will go on for pages detailing corporate performance that is woefully inadequate. He will nonetheless end with a warm paragraph describing his managerial comrades as "our most precious asset." Such comments sometimes make you wonder what the other assets can possibly be. At Berkshire, however, my appraisal of our operating managers is, if anything, understated. To understand why, first take a look at page 7, where we show the earnings (on an historical - cost accounting basis) of our seven largest non - financial units: Buffalo News, Fechheimer, Kirby, Nebraska Furniture Mart, Scott Fetzer Manufacturing Group, See's Candies, and World Book. In 1987, these seven business units had combined operating earnings before interest and taxes of $180 million. By itself, this figure says nothing about economic performance. To evaluate that, we must know how much total capital - debt and equity - was needed to produce these earnings. Debt plays an insignificant role at our seven units: their net interest expense in 1987 was only $2 million. Thus, pre - tax earnings on the equity capital employed by these businesses amounted to $178 million. And this equity - again on an historical - cost basis - was only $175 million. If these seven business units had operated as a single company, their 1987 after - tax earnings would have been approximately $100 million - a return of about 57% on equity capital. You'll seldom see such a percentage anywhere, let alone at large, diversified companies with nominal leverage. Here's a benchmark: in its 1988 Investor's Guide issue, Fortune reported that among the 500 largest industrial companies and 500 largest service companies, only six had averaged a return on equity of over 30% during the previous decade. The best performer among the 1000 was Commerce Clearing House at 40.2%. Of course, the returns that Berkshire earns from these seven units are not as high as their underlying returns because, in aggregate, we bought the businesses at a substantial premium to underlying equity capital. Overall, these operations are carried on our books at about $222 million above the historical accounting values of the underlying assets.

We view ourselves as business analysts - not as market analysts, not as macroeconomic analysts, and not even as security analysts. Whenever Charlie and I buy common stocks for Berkshire's insurance companies, we approach the transaction as if we were buying into a private business. We look at the economic prospects of the business, the people in charge of running it, and the price we must pay. We do not have in mind any time or price for sale. Indeed, we are willing to hold a stock indefinitely so long as we expect the business to increase in intrinsic value at a satisfactory rate. When investing, we view ourselves as business analysts - not as market analysts, not as macroeconomic analysts, and not even as security analysts.

Occasionally the stock market offers us the chance to buy non - controlling pieces of extraordinary businesses at truly ridiculous prices. The 1987 stock market crash provided just such an opportunity. We had a few purchases that we thought were attractive, but we were unable to make large commitments before prices rebounded.

Our major investment in 1987 was a $700 million purchase of Salomon Inc. 9% preferred stock. This preferred is convertible after three years into Salomon common stock at $38 per share and, if not converted, will be redeemed ratably over five years beginning October 31, 1995. From most standpoints, this commitment fits into the medium - term fixed - income securities category. In addition, we have an interesting conversion possibility. We, of course, have no special insights regarding the direction or future profitability of investment banking. We do, however, have a high regard for the ability and character of John Gutfreund, Salomon's CEO. Charlie and I have known John since 1976, when he played a key role in saving GEICO from bankruptcy. We have seen him guide clients away from foolish transactions, even when such actions cost Salomon substantial fees. This client - first attitude is uncommon on Wall Street.

We also made some investments in short - term arbitrage situations during 1987. We have been involved in arbitrage for many years and have had good results overall. Our pre - tax annual return from arbitrage has probably been about 25%. We do not engage in arbitrage transactions that involve companies in which there is substantial risk of financial distress. Our largest arbitrage investment in 1987 was a $76 million purchase of 1 million shares of Allegis. At year - end, the market value of this investment was about $78 million.

We continue to avoid long - term bonds. Bonds are no better than the currency in which they are denominated. In the past decade and for the foreseeable future, we do not see much appeal in U.S. bonds. Our huge trade deficit has led to a large and growing accumulation of foreign - owned U.S. government and corporate bonds, bank deposits, and the like. The U.S. government has so far dealt with this situation by relying on the "kindness of strangers," as Blanche DuBois put it in A Streetcar Named Desire. Foreigners have shown remarkable faith in the U.S., but this faith may be misplaced. As the trade deficit continues to grow and the U.S. government has the ability to print money, the risk of inflation increases. We are not predicting when or how this inflation will occur, but we are aware of the risk.

We do, however, hold some intermediate - term tax - exempt bonds. These bonds have served us well as a substitute for short - term cash equivalents. We have about $900 million of these bonds, most of which are grandfathered under the 1986 Tax Reform Act and are fully tax - exempt. We will sell these bonds if we find better investment opportunities.

In addition to our investments in stocks and bonds, we also have some investments in other areas. For example, we own some Texaco short - term bonds that we bought after the company filed for bankruptcy. These bonds are attractive to us because of their low price and the fact that we believe we will be able to recover our investment even in the worst - case scenario. At year - end, our cost of these bonds was about $100 million and their market value was about $120 million.

We also own some Washington Public Power Supply System bonds. We have been investing in these bonds since 1984 and have increased our position in 1987. At year - end, our unamortized cost of these bonds was $240 million and their market value was $316 million. We also receive about $34 million in tax - exempt interest income from these bonds each year.

Benjamin Graham's "Mr. Market" analogy is very useful in understanding the stock market. Mr. Market is like a partner in a private business who offers to buy or sell his share of the business to you every day. Sometimes he is in a good mood and offers a high price, and sometimes he is in a bad mood and offers a low price. As investors, we should not be influenced by Mr. Market's mood. We should focus on the underlying value of the business and take advantage of Mr. Market's foolishness when he offers a low price.

Many commentators have drawn an incorrect conclusion upon observing recent events: they are fond of saying that the small investor has no chance in a market now dominated by the erratic behavior of the big boys. This conclusion is dead wrong. Such markets are ideal for any investor - small or large - so long as he sticks to his investment knitting. Volatility caused by money managers who speculate irrationally with huge sums will offer the true investor more chances to make intelligent investment moves. He can be hurt by such volatility only if he is forced, by either financial or psychological pressures, to sell at untoward times.

In conclusion, we are pleased with the performance of Berkshire in 1987. We have continued to build a portfolio of high - quality businesses and investments, and we look forward to further growth in the future. We will continue to follow our long - established investment principles and focus on the long - term value of our investments.

Warren E. Buffett
Chairman of the Board

February 29, 1988