巴菲特1995年致股东的信（英文版）

Here is the full text of Buffett's letter to shareholders in 1995:

Berkshire's gain in net worth during 1995 was $5.3 billion, or 45% of beginning net worth. In 1994 we had used the issuance of shares in connection with two acquisitions, causing a 1.3% increase in the number of shares outstanding. As a result, per - share net worth increased 43.1%. Overall, since the present management took over in 1965, per - share net worth has grown from $19 to $14,426, a rate of 23.6% compounded annually.

We had a good year in 1995, but there's nothing extraordinary about that. As President Kennedy said, "A rising tide lifts all yachts." In a market as strong as that of 1995, any fool could have made large sums of money.

We made three acquisitions in 1995 that I want to tell you about. The first two, Helzberg's Diamond Shops and R.C. Willey Home Furnishings, were purchases of 100% of the businesses. The third was our merger with GEICO, a company in which we had held a significant minority interest for many years.

Charlie Munger, Berkshire's vice - chairman and my partner, and I want to build a collection of companies – both wholly - and partly - owned – that have excellent economic characteristics and that are run by outstanding managers. Our favorite acquisition is the negotiated transaction that allows us to purchase 100% of such a business at a fair price. But we are almost as happy when the stock market offers us the chance to buy a modest percentage of an outstanding business at a pro - rata price well below what it would take to buy 100%. This double - barrelled approach - purchases of entire businesses through negotiation or purchases of part - interests through the stock market – gives us an important advantage over capital - allocators who stick to a single course.

Retailing is a tough business. During my investment career, I have watched a large number of retailers enjoy terrific growth and superb returns on equity for a period, and then suddenly nosedive, often all the way into bankruptcy4. This shooting - star phenomenon is far more common in retailing than it is in manufacturing or service businesses4. In part, this is because a retailer must stay smart, day after day. Your competitor is always copying and then topping whatever you do. Shoppers are meanwhile beckoned in every conceivable way to try a stream of new merchants. In retailing, to coast is to fail4.

GEICO certainly appears to fall into the "have - to - be - smart - once" business category4. The company at its outset came up with the business model of direct selling to policyholders, instead of selling through agents. This caused GEICO's costs to come in well below those of other insurance companies, which has proven to be an enduring competitive advantage, or moat around its corporate castle4.

Over the years, we have done well on producing high returns on our assets. But we have also benefitted greatly - to a degree that is not generally well - understood - because our liabilities have cost us very little. An important reason for this low cost is that we have obtained float on very advantageous terms. The same cannot be said by many other property and casualty insurers, who may generate plenty of float, but at a cost that exceeds what the funds are worth to them. In those circumstances, leverage becomes a disadvantage.

Let's assume that instead of our having $3.4 billion of float at the end of 1994, we had replaced it with $3.4 billion of equity. Under this scenario, we would have owned no more assets than we did during 1995. We would, however, have had somewhat lower earnings because the cost of float was negative last year. That is, our float threw off profits. And, of course, to obtain the replacement equity, we would have needed to sell many new shares of Berkshire. The net result – more shares, equal assets and lower earnings – would have materially reduced the value of our stock. So you can understand why float wonderfully benefits a business – if it is obtained at a low cost.

A simplified description of three transactions from last year will illustrate both what I mean and Ajit's versatility. We insured: (1) the life of Mike Tyson for a sum that is large initially and that, fight - by - fight, gradually declines to zero over the next few years; (2) Lloyd's against more than 225 of its "names" dying during the year; and (3) the launch, and a year of orbit, of two Chinese satellites. Happily, both satellites are orbiting, the Lloyd's folk avoided abnormal mortality, and if Mike Tyson looked any healthier, no one would get in the ring with him.

Charlie and I do not care whether our shareholders own Berkshire in large or small amounts3. What we wish for are shareholders of any size who are knowledgeable about our operations, share our objectives and long - term perspective, and are aware of our limitations, most particularly those imposed by our large capital base3.

We will continue to run Berkshire in a way that maximizes the long - term value of your investment in the company. We will make decisions based on what we believe is in the best interests of our shareholders, not on what will make our jobs easier or more glamorous.

In 1995, we had a good year, but we know that the future will bring challenges as well as opportunities. We will continue to work hard to allocate capital wisely, to build and strengthen our businesses, and to increase the value of Berkshire for our shareholders. Thank you for your continued support.

Warren E. Buffett

Chairman of the Board

February 28, 1996

The above is a partial translation and summary. If you want to read the full text, you can refer to the official website of Berkshire Hathaway or relevant financial literature.