The following is the English version of the 2005 Letter to Berkshire Shareholders:
Dear Berkshire Shareholders:
In 2005, our net worth increased by $5.6 billion, or 6.4% per share for both our Class A and Class B stock. Since present management took over 39 years ago, per - share book value has grown from $19 to $59,377, a rate of 21.5% compounded annually.
It's per - share intrinsic value that counts, however. Here, the news is good: Between 1964 and 2005, Berkshire morphed from a struggling northern textile business whose intrinsic value was less than book into a widely diversified enterprise worth far more than book. Our 39 - year gain in intrinsic value has therefore somewhat exceeded our 21.5% gain in book. (For a better understanding of intrinsic value and the economic principles that guide Charlie Munger, my partner and Berkshire's vice - chairman, and me in running Berkshire, please read our Owner's Manual, beginning on page 69.)
Operating Earnings
Despite their shortcomings, book value calculations are useful at Berkshire as a slightly understated gauge for measuring the long - term rate of increase in our intrinsic value. The calculation is less relevant, however, than it once was in rating any single year's performance versus the S & P 500 index (a comparison we display on the facing page). Our equity holdings, including convertible preferreds, have fallen considerably as a percentage of our net worth, from an average of 114% in the 1980s, for example, to an average of 50% in 2000 - 03. Therefore, yearly movements in the stock market now affect a much smaller portion of our net worth than was once the case.
Nonetheless, Berkshire's long - term performance versus the S & P remains all - important. Our shareholders can buy the S & P through an index fund at very low cost. Unless we achieve gains in per - share intrinsic value in the future that outdo the S & P's performance, Charlie and I will be adding nothing to what you can accomplish on your own.
If we fail, we will have no excuses. Charlie and I operate in an ideal environment. To begin with, we are supported by an incredible group of men and women who run our operating units. If there were a Corporate Cooperstown, its roster would surely include many of our CEOs. Any shortfall in Berkshire's results will not be caused by our managers.
Additionally, we enjoy a rare sort of managerial freedom. Most companies are saddled with institutional constraints. A company's history, for example, may commit it to an industry that now offers limited opportunity. A more common problem is a shareholder constituency that pressures its manager to dance to Wall Street's tune. Many CEOs resist, but others give in and adopt operating and capital - allocation policies far different from those they would choose if left to themselves.
At Berkshire, neither history nor the demands of owners impede intelligent decision - making. When Charlie and I make mistakes, they are -- in tennis parlance -- unforced errors.
Taxes
On May 20, 2003, The Washington Post ran an op - ed piece by me that was critical of the Bush tax proposals. Thirteen days later, Pamela Olson, Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy at the U.S. Treasury, delivered a speech about the new tax legislation saying, "That means a certain midwestern oracle, who, it must be noted, has played the tax code like a fiddle, is still safe retaining all his earnings." I think she was talking about me.
Alas, my "fiddle playing" will not get me to Carnegie Hall -- or even to a high school recital. Berkshire, on your behalf and mine, will send the Treasury $3.3 billion for tax on its 2005 income, a sum equaling 2.5% of the total income tax paid by all U.S. corporations in fiscal 2005. (In contrast, Berkshire's market valuation is about 1% of the value of all American corporations.) Our payment will almost certainly place us among our country's top ten taxpayers. Indeed, if only 540 taxpayers paid the amount Berkshire will pay, no other individual or corporation would have to pay anything to Uncle Sam. That's right: 290 million Americans and all other businesses would not have to pay a dime in income, social security, excise or estate taxes to the federal government.
Berkshire Governance
In judging whether Corporate America is serious about reforming itself, CEO pay remains the acid test. To date, the results aren't encouraging. A few CEOs, such as Jeff Immelt of General Electric, have led the way in initiating programs that are fair to managers and shareholders alike. Generally, however, his example has been more admired than followed.
It's understandable how pay got out of hand. When management hires employees, or when companies bargain with a vendor, the intensity of interest is equal on both sides of the table. One party's gain is the other party's loss, and the money involved has real meaning to both. The result is an honest - to - God negotiation.
But when CEOs (or their representatives) have met with compensation committees, too often one side -- the CEO's -- has cared far more than the other about what bargain is struck. A CEO, for example, will always regard the difference between receiving options for 100,000 shares or for 500,000 as monumental. To a comp committee, however, the difference may seem unimportant -- particularly if, as has been the case at most companies, neither grant will have any effect on reported earnings. Under these conditions, the negotiation often has a "play - money" quality.
Overreaching by CEOs greatly accelerated in the 1990s as compensation packages gained by the most avaricious -- a title for which there was vigorous competition -- were promptly replicated elsewhere. The couriers for this epidemic of greed were usually consultants and human relations departments, which had no trouble perceiving who buttered their bread. As one compensation consultant commented: "There are two classes of clients you don't want to offend -- actual and potential."
In proposals for reforming this malfunctioning system, the cry has been for "independent" directors. But the question of what truly motivates independence has largely been neglected.
In last year's report, I took a look at how "independent" directors -- as defined by statute -- had performed in the mutual fund field. The Investment Company Act of 1940 mandated such directors, and that means we've had an extended test of what statutory standards produce. In our examination last year, we looked at the record of fund directors in respect to the two key tasks board members should perform -- whether at a mutual fund business or any other. These two all - important functions are, first, to obtain (or retain) an able and honest manager and then to compensate that manager fairly.
Our survey was not encouraging. Year after year, at literally thousands of funds, directors had routinely rehired the incumbent management company, however pathetic its performance had been. Just as routinely, the directors had mindlessly approved fees that in many cases far exceeded those that could have been negotiated. Then, when a management company was sold -- invariably at a huge price relative to tangible assets -- the directors experienced a "counter - revelation" and immediately signed on with the new manager and accepted its fee schedule. In effect, the directors decided that whoever would pay the most for the old management company was the party that should manage the shareholders' money in the future.
Despite the lapdog behavior of independent fund directors, we did not conclude that they are bad people. They're not. But sadly, "boardroom atmosphere" almost invariably sedates their fiduciary genes.
On May 22, 2003, not long after Berkshire's report appeared, the Chairman of the Investment Company Institute addressed its membership about "The State of our Industry." Responding to those who have "weighed in about our perceived failings," he mused, "It makes me wonder what life would be like if we'd actually done something wrong."
Be careful what you wish for.
Within a few months, the world began to learn that many fund - management companies had followed policies that hurt the owners of the funds they managed, while simultaneously boosting the fees of the managers. Prior to their transgressions, it should be noted, these management companies were earning profit margins and returns on tangible equity that were the envy of Corporate America. Yet to swell profits further, they trampled on the interests of fund shareholders in an appalling manner.
So what are the directors of these looted funds doing? As I write this, I have seen none that have terminated the contract of the offending management company (though naturally that entity has often fired some of its employees). Can you imagine directors who had been personally defrauded taking such a boys - will - be - boys attitude?
To top it all off, at least one miscreant management company has put itself up for sale, undoubtedly hoping to receive a huge sum for "delivering" the mutual funds it has managed to the highest bidder among other managers. This is a travesty. Why in the world don't the directors of those funds simply select whomever they think is best among the bidding organizations and sign up with that party directly? The winner would consequently be spared a huge "payoff" to the former manager who, having flouted the principles of stewardship, deserves not a dime. Not having to bear that acquisition cost, the winner could surely manage the funds in question for a far lower ongoing fee than would otherwise have been the case. Any truly independent director should insist on this approach to obtaining a new manager.
The reality is that neither the decades - old rules regulating investment company directors nor the new rules bearing down on Corporate America foster the election of truly independent directors. In both instances, an individual who is receiving 100% of his income from director fees -- and who may wish to enhance his income through election to other boards -- is deemed independent. That is nonsense. The same rules say that Berkshire director and lawyer Ron Olson, who receives from us perhaps 3% of his very large income, does not qualify as independent because that 3% comes from legal fees Berkshire pays his firm rather than from fees he earns as a Berkshire director. Rest assured, 3% from any source would not torpedo Ron's independence. But getting 20%, 30% or 50% of their income from director fees might well temper the independence of many individuals, particularly if their overall income is not large. Indeed, I think it's clear that at mutual funds, it has.
Let me make a small suggestion to "independent" mutual fund directors. Why not simply affirm in each annual report that "(1) We have looked at other management companies and believe the one we have retained for the upcoming year is among the better operations in the field; and (2) we have negotiated a fee with our managers comparable to what other clients with equivalent funds would negotiate."
It does not seem unreasonable for shareholders to expect fund directors -- who are often receiving fees that exceed $100,000 annually -- to declare themselves on these points. Certainly these directors would satisfy themselves on both matters were they handing over a large chunk of their own money to the manager. If directors are unwilling to make these two declarations, shareholders should heed the maxim "If you don't know whose side someone is on, he's probably not on yours."
Finally, a disclaimer. A great many funds have been run well and conscientiously despite the opportunities for malfeasance that exist. The shareholders of these funds have benefited, and their managers have earned their pay. Indeed, if I were a director of certain funds, including some that charge above - average fees, I would enthusiastically make the two declarations I have suggested. Additionally, those index funds that are very low - cost (such as Vanguard's) are investor - friendly by definition and are the best selection for most of those who wish to own equities.
I am on my soapbox now only because the blatant wrongdoing that has occurred has betrayed the trust of so many millions of shareholders. Hundreds of industry insiders had to know what was going on, yet none publicly said a word. It took Eliot Spitzer, and the whistleblowers who aided him, to initiate a housecleaning. We urge fund directors to continue the job. Like directors throughout Corporate America, these fiduciaries must now decide whether their job is to work for owners or for managers.
Financial and Financial Products
This sector includes a wide - ranging group of activities. Here's some commentary on the most important.
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I manage a few opportunistic strategies in AAA fixed - income securities that have been quite profitable in the last few years. These opportunities come and go -- and at present, they are going. We sped their departure somewhat last year, thereby realizing 24% of the capital gains we show in the table that follows.
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A far less pleasant unwinding operation is taking place at Gen Re Securities, the trading and derivatives operation we inherited when we purchased General Reinsurance.
When we began to liquidate Gen Re Securities in early 2002, it had 23,218 outstanding tickets with 884 counterparties (some having names I couldn't pronounce, much less creditworthiness I could evaluate). Since then, the unit's managers have been skillful and diligent in unwinding positions. Yet, at yearend -- nearly two years later -- we still had 7,580 tickets outstanding with 453 counterparties. (As the country song laments, "How can I miss you if you won't go away?")
The shrinking of this business has been costly. We've had pre - tax losses of $173 million in 2002 and $99 million in 2003. These losses, it should be noted, came from a portfolio of contracts that -- in full compliance with GAAP -- had been regularly marked - to - market with standard allowances for future credit - loss and administrative costs. Moreover, our liquidation has taken place both in a benign market -- we've had no credit losses of significance -- and in an orderly manner. This is just the opposite of what might be expected if a financial crisis forced a number of derivatives dealers to cease operations simultaneously.
And now it's confession time: I'm sure I could have saved you $100 million or so, pre - tax, if I had acted more promptly to shut down Gen Re Securities. Both Charlie and I knew at the time of the General Reinsurance merger that its derivatives business was unattractive. Reported profits struck us as illusory, and we felt that the business carried sizable risks that could not effectively be measured or limited. Moreover, we knew that any major problems the operation might experience would likely correlate with troubles in the financial or insurance world that would affect Berkshire elsewhere. In other words, if the derivatives business were ever to need shoring up, it would commandeer the capital and credit of Berkshire at just the time we could otherwise deploy those resources to huge advantage.
Charlie would have moved swiftly to close down Gen Re Securities -- no question about that. I, however, dithered. As a consequence, our shareholders are paying a far higher price than was necessary to exit this business.
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Though we include Gen Re's sizable life and health reinsurance business in the "insurance" sector, we show the results for Ajit Jain's life and annuity business in this section. That's because this business, in large part, involves arbitraging money. Our annuities range from a retail product sold directly on the Internet to structured settlements that require us to make payments for 70 years or more to people severely injured in accidents.
We've realized some extra income in this business because of accelerated principal payments we received from certain fixed - income securities we had purchased at discounts. This phenomenon has ended, and earnings are therefore likely to be lower in this segment during the next few years.
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We have a $604 million investment in Value Capital, a partnership run by Mark Byrne, a member of a family that has helped Berkshire over the years in many ways. Berkshire is a limited partner in, and has no say in the management of, Mark's enterprise, which specializes in highly - hedged fixed - income opportunities. Mark is smart and honest and, along with his family, has a significant investment in Value.
Because of accounting abuses at Enron and elsewhere, rules will soon be instituted that are likely to require that Value's assets and liabilities be consolidated on Berkshire's balance sheet. We regard this requirement as inappropriate, given that Value's liabilities -- which usually are above $20 billion -- are in no way ours. Over time, other investors will join us as partners in Value. When enough do, the need for us to consolidate Value will disappear.
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We have told you in the past about Berkadia, the partnership we formed three years ago with Leucadia to finance and manage the wind - down of Finova, a bankrupt lending operation. The plan was that we would supply most of the capital and Leucadia would supply most of the brains. And that's the way it has worked. Indeed, Joe Steinberg and Ian Cumming, who together run Leucadia, have done such a fine job in liquidating Finova's portfolio that the $5.6 billion guarantee we took on in connection with the transaction has been extinguished. The unfortunate byproduct of this fast payoff is that our future income will be much reduced. Overall, Berkadia has made excellent money for us, and Joe and Ian have been terrific partners.
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Our leasing businesses are XTRA (transportation equipment) and CORT (office furniture). Both operations have had poor earnings during the past two years as the recession caused demand to drop considerably more than was anticipated. They remain leaders in their fields, and I expect at least a modest improvement in their earnings this year.
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Through our Clayton purchase, we acquired a significant manufactured - housing finance operation. Clayton, like others in this business, had traditionally securitized the loans it originated. The practice relieved stress on Clayton's balance sheet, but a by - product was the "front - ending" of income (a result dictated by GAAP).
We are in no hurry to record income, have enormous balance - sheet strength, and believe that over the long - term the economics of holding our consumer paper are superior to what we can now realize through securitization. So Clayton has begun to retain its loans.
We believe it's appropriate to finance a soundly - selected book of interest - bearing receivables almost entirely with debt (just as a bank would). Therefore, Berkshire will borrow money to finance Clayton's portfolio and re - lend these funds to Clayton at our cost plus one percentage point. This markup fairly compensates Berkshire for putting its exceptional creditworthiness to work, but it still delivers money to Clayton at an attractive price.
In 2003, Berkshire did $2 billion of such borrowing and re - lending, with Clayton using much of this money to fund several large purchases of portfolios from lenders exiting the business. A portion of our loans to Clayton also provided "catch - up" funding for paper it had generated earlier in the year from its own operation and had found difficult to securitize.
You may wonder why we borrow money while sitting on a mountain of cash. It's because of our "every tub on its own bottom" philosophy. We believe that any subsidiary lending money should pay an appropriate rate for the funds needed to carry its receivables and should not be subsidized by its parent. Otherwise, having a rich daddy can lead to sloppy decisions. Meanwhile, the cash we accumulate at Berkshire is destined for business acquisitions or for the purchase of securities that offer opportunities for significant profit. Clayton's loan portfolio will likely grow to at least $5 billion in not too many years and, with sensible credit standards in place, should deliver significant earnings.
For simplicity's sake, we include all of Clayton's earnings in this sector, though a sizable portion is derived from areas other than consumer finance.
For simplicity's sake, we include all of Clayton's earnings in this sector, though a sizable portion is derived from areas other than consumer finance.
