巴菲特1979年致股东的信（英文版）

以下是 1979 年巴菲特致股东的信英文版全文：

To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:

Again, we must lead off with a few words about accounting. Since our last annual report, the accounting profession has decided that equity securities owned by insurance companies must be carried on the balance sheet at market value. We previously have carried such equity securities at the lower of aggregate cost or aggregate market value. Because we have large unrealized gains in our insurance equity holdings, the result of this new policy is to increase substantially both the 1978 and 1979 year - end net worth, even after the appropriate liability is established for taxes on capital gains that would be payable should equities be sold at such market valuations.

As you know, Blue Chip Stamps, our 60% - owned subsidiary, is fully consolidated in Berkshire Hathaway’s financial statements. However, Blue Chip still is required to carry its equity investments at the lower of aggregate cost or aggregate market value, just as Berkshire Hathaway’s insurance subsidiaries did prior to this year. Should the same equities be purchased at an identical price by an insurance subsidiary of Berkshire Hathaway and by Blue Chip Stamps, present accounting principles often would require that they end up carried on our consolidated balance sheet at two different values. (That should keep you on your toes.) Market values of Blue Chip Stamps’ equity holdings are given in footnote 3 on page 18.

We continue to feel that the ratio of operating earnings (before securities gains or losses) to shareholders’ equity with all securities valued at cost is the most appropriate way to measure any single year’s operating performance. Measuring such results against shareholders’ equity with securities valued at market could significantly distort the operating performance percentage because of wide year - to - year market value changes in the net worth figure that serves as the denominator. For example, a large decline in securities values could result in a very low “market value” net worth that, in turn, could cause mediocre operating earnings to look unrealistically good. Alternatively, the more successful that equity investments have been, the larger the net worth base becomes and the poorer the operating performance figure appears. Therefore, we will continue to report operating performance measured against beginning net worth, with securities valued at cost.

On this basis, we had a reasonably good operating performance in 1979 - but not quite as good as that of 1978 - with operating earnings amounting to 18.6% of beginning net worth. Earnings per share, of course, increased somewhat (about 20%) but we regard this as an improper figure upon which to focus. We had substantially more capital to work with in 1979 than in 1978, and our performance in utilizing that capital fell short of the earlier year, even though per - share earnings rose. “Earnings per share” will rise constantly on a dormant savings account or on a U.S. savings bond bearing a fixed rate of return simply because “earnings” (the stated interest rate) are continuously plowed back and added to the capital base. Thus, even a “stopped clock” can look like a growth stock if the dividend payout ratio is low.

The primary test of managerial economic performance is the achievement of a high earnings rate on equity capital employed (without undue leverage, accounting gimmickry, etc.) and not the achievement of consistent gains in earnings per share. In our view, many businesses would be better understood by their shareholder - owners, as well as the general public, if managements and financial analysts modified the primary emphasis they place upon earnings per share, and upon yearly changes in that figure.

We have no corporate solution to the problem of inflation. High inflation rates will not help us earn higher rates of return on equity. We intend to continue to do as well as we can in managing the internal affairs of the business. But you should understand that external conditions affecting the stability of currency may very well be the most important factor in determining whether there are any real rewards from your investment in Berkshire Hathaway.

Our textile business continues to be a problem. A few years ago we decided to buy an additional textile mill, due to it being offered at a bargain price. This, however, proved to be a mistake, leading us to conclude that “turnarounds” seldom turn, and that the same energies and talent are much better employed in a good business purchased at a fair price than in a poor business purchased at a bargain price.

In a rising inflationary environment, interest rates increase, and on long - dated debt instruments already in existence, the market value of those securities will decrease, thus increasing their yield for new purchasers of the debt. We have severe doubts as to whether a very long - term fixed - interest bond, denominated in dollars, remains an appropriate business contract in a world where the value of dollars seems almost certain to shrink by the day. Those dollars, as well as paper creations of other governments, simply may have too many structural weaknesses to appropriately serve as a unit of long - term commercial reference. If so, really long bonds may turn out to be obsolete instruments and insurers who have bought those maturities of 2010 or 2020 could have major and continuing problems on their hands. We, likewise, will be unhappy with our fifteen - year bonds and will annually pay a price in terms of earning power that reflects that mistake.

For the last few years our insurance companies have not been a net purchaser of any straight - term bonds. Instead, we have favored convertible bonds and shorter - term instruments. Even so, we underestimated the seriousness of the inflation problem and the impact it would have on our bond holdings.

We continue to look for opportunities to invest in businesses that meet our four criteria: (1) businesses we can understand, (2) with favorable long - term prospects, (3) operated by honest and competent people, and (4) priced very attractively. We are willing to concentrate our investments in a few such businesses, rather than diversify simply for the sake of diversification. We believe that this approach allows us to achieve higher returns at lower risk over the long term.

We also want to emphasize that the success of our investments depends not only on the quality of the businesses we invest in, but also on the price we pay for them. We are always on the lookout for bargains, and we are willing to be patient until the right opportunities come along.

In conclusion, we are pleased with the overall progress of Berkshire Hathaway in 1979, but we also recognize the challenges that lie ahead, particularly in the areas of inflation and interest rates. We will continue to do our best to manage the company’s affairs in a way that maximizes shareholder value, and we appreciate your continued support and confidence.

Warren E. Buffett
Chairman of the Board

March 3, 1980