巴菲特1982年致股东的信（英文版）

Here is the full text of Buffett's letter to shareholders in 1982:

To the stockholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:

Operating earnings of $31.5 million in 1982 amounted to only 9.8% of beginning equity capital (valuing securities at cost), down from 15.2% in 1981 and far below our recent high of 19.4% in 1978. This decline largely resulted from:
(1) A significant deterioration in insurance underwriting results;
(2) A considerable expansion of equity capital without a corresponding growth in the businesses we operate directly; and
(3) A continually - enlarging commitment of our resources to investment in partially - owned, non - operated businesses; accounting rules dictate that a major part of our pro - rata share of earnings from such businesses must be excluded from Berkshire's reported earnings.

It was only a few years ago that we told you that the operating earnings/equity capital percentage, with proper allowance for a few other variables, was the most important yardstick of single - year managerial performance. While we still believe this to be the case with the vast majority of companies, we believe its utility in our own case has greatly diminished. You should be suspicious of such an assertion. Yardsticks seldom are discarded while yielding favorable readings. But when results deteriorate, most managers favor disposition of the yardstick rather than disposition of the manager.

To managers faced with such deterioration, a more flexible measurement system often suggests itself: just shoot the arrow of business performance into a blank canvas and then carefully draw the bullseye around the implanted arrow. We generally believe in pre - set, long - lived and small bullseyes. However, because of the importance of item (3) above, further explained in the following section, we believe our abandonment of the operating earnings/equity capital bullseye to be warranted.

The appended financial statements reflect “accounting” earnings that generally include our proportionate share of earnings from any underlying business in which our ownership is at least 20%. Below the 20% ownership figure, however, only our share of dividends paid by the underlying business units is included in our accounting numbers; undistributed earnings of such less - than - 20% - owned businesses are totally ignored.

There are a few exceptions to this rule; e.g., we own about 35% of Geico Corporation but, because we have assigned our voting rights, the company is treated for accounting purposes as a less - than - 20% holding. Thus, dividends received from Geico in 1982 of $3.5 million after tax are the only item included in our “accounting” earnings. An additional $23 million that represents our share of Geico's undistributed operating earnings for 1982 is totally excluded from our reported operating earnings. If Geico had earned less money in 1982 but had paid an additional $1 million in dividends, our reported earnings would have been larger despite the poorer business results. Conversely, if Geico had earned an additional $100 million - and retained it all - our reported earnings would have been unchanged. Clearly “accounting” earnings can seriously misrepresent economic reality.

We prefer a concept of “economic” earnings that includes all undistributed earnings, regardless of ownership percentage. In our view, the value to all owners of the retained earnings of a business enterprise is determined by the effectiveness with which those earnings are used - and not by the size of one's ownership percentage. If you have owned.01 of 1% of Berkshire during the past decade, you have benefited economically in full measure from your share of our retained earnings, no matter what your accounting system. Proportionately, you have done just as well as if you had owned the magic 20%. But if you have owned 100% of a great many capital - intensive businesses during the decade, retained earnings that were credited fully and with painstaking precision to you under standard accounting methods have resulted in minor or zero economic value. This is not a criticism of accounting procedures. We would not like to have the job of designing a better system. It's simply to say that managers and investors alike must understand that accounting numbers are the beginning, not the end, of business valuation.

In most corporations, less - than - 20% ownership positions are unimportant (perhaps, in part, because they prevent maximization of cherished reported earnings) and the distinction between accounting and economic results we have just discussed matters little. But in our own case, such positions are of very large and growing importance. Their magnitude, we believe, is what makes our reported operating earnings figure of limited significance.

In our 1981 annual report we predicted that our share of undistributed earnings from four of our major non - controlled holdings would aggregate over $35 million in 1982. With no change in our holdings of three of these companies - Geico, General Foods and the Washington Post - and a considerable increase in our ownership of the fourth, R. J. Reynolds Industries, our share of undistributed 1982 operating earnings of this group came to well over $40 million. This number - not reflected at all in our earnings - is greater than our total reported earnings, which include only the $14 million in dividends received from these companies. And, of course, we have a number of smaller ownership interests that, in aggregate, had substantial additional undistributed earnings.

We attach real significance to the general magnitude of these numbers, but we don't believe they should be precisely quantified. The figure of $40 million, for example, is only a rough approximation. Our purpose is to make clear the importance of these non - reported earnings and to emphasize that they are as important to us as reported earnings.

Berkshire and its subsidiaries have on occasion considered the issuance of equity to finance acquisitions. Our basic rule in such cases is simple: we will not issue shares unless we receive as much intrinsic business value as we give. This principle should be obvious, but Buffett noted that many corporate managers do not follow this basic idea.

In mergers and acquisitions, managers must choose to use cash or debt. If, as is often the case, equity is needed to finance any shortfall, sometimes a manager will find the M&A is happening when his own stock is selling far below intrinsic business value. Buffett calls this a moment of truth for shareholders and quoted Yogi Berra, who said, “You can observe a lot just by watching.” The investor continued, “For shareholders then will find which objective the management truly prefers - expansion of domain or maintenance of owners’ wealth.”

Buffett then says if we flipped the situation - the buyer was instead selling its entire business, then he could probably negotiate in the sale to receive full intrinsic business value. However, in this case, “when the buyer makes a partial sale of itself - and that is what the issuance of shares to make an acquisition amounts to - it can customarily get no higher value set on its shares than the market chooses to grant it.” If the acquirer continues and uses an undervalued (market value) currency to pay for a fully valued (negotiated value) asset, the acquirer is, in effect, “giving up $2 of value to receive $1 of value.” If this happens, even a marvelous asset bought at a fair sale price becomes a terrible acquisition.

The ideal solution is to have a “true business - value - for - business - value merger.” This should be fair to shareholders of both sides, and if done correctly each party receives what it pays in terms of intrinsic business value.

The insurance industry had a very poor year in 1982, and our results were no exception. The industry's combined ratio (the ratio of losses and expenses to premiums) rose to 109.6%, the highest level since 1975. Our own combined ratio was 109.4%, compared to 103.9% in 1981.

The root of this problem lies in the fact that insurance is a commodity business; its service amounts to a promise, and most purchasers take every insurer's word to be that of the saint. Even worse, in insurance, barriers to entry are few; anyone with sufficient regulatory capital and a John Hancock can make a promise. Insurance then, unlike other commodity businesses, almost always operates “under the competitive sword of substantial overcapacity.” Only in those rare cases where there is a natural or financial megadisaster does capacity retreat; and until such an event, Buffett forecasts that the insurance industry will not be profitable.

We will continue to work hard to improve our underwriting results. We have made some changes in our management structure and have added some new people with excellent underwriting skills. We are also looking for new ways to reduce our costs and improve our efficiency. However, we cannot predict when the insurance industry will return to profitability. We will continue to monitor the situation closely and make the necessary adjustments as conditions change.

We continue to look for opportunities to acquire businesses that meet our criteria. Our ideal acquisition is a business that:
(1) Is simple and understandable;
(2) Has consistent operating history;
(3) Has favorable long - term prospects;
(4) Is available at a reasonable price; and
(5) Is run by honest and competent managers.

We are not interested in businesses that require major capital expenditures or that are in highly competitive industries with low barriers to entry. We also prefer to acquire businesses where we can continue to use the existing management team. We believe that the key to a successful acquisition is to find a good business with a good management team and then let them continue to run the business in the way they know best.

We have not made any major acquisitions in 1982, but we have looked at a number of opportunities. We will continue to be patient and wait for the right opportunities to come along. We are confident that we will be able to find some good businesses to acquire in the future that will meet our criteria and add value to Berkshire Hathaway.

In conclusion, we are disappointed with our operating results in 1982, but we are not discouraged. We believe that the long - term prospects for Berkshire Hathaway are still very good. We have a strong portfolio of businesses and investments, and we are committed to continuing to build value for our shareholders.

We would like to thank our shareholders for their continued support and confidence in Berkshire Hathaway. We also want to thank the managers of our subsidiaries for their hard work and dedication. We look forward to serving you in the years to come and continuing to build a great company.

Warren E. Buffett
Chairman of the Board