以下是 1983 年巴菲特致股东的信英文版全文：
To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.：
This past year our registered shareholders increased from about 1900 to about 2900. Most of this growth resulted from our merger with Blue Chip Stamps, but there also was an acceleration in the pace of “natural” increase that has raised us from the 1000 level a few years ago. With so many new shareholders, it’s appropriate to summarize the major business principles we follow that pertain to the manager - owner relationship:
- Although our form is corporate, our attitude is partnership. Charlie Munger and I think of our shareholders as owner - partners, and of ourselves as managing partners. (Because of the size of our shareholdings we also are, for better or worse, controlling partners.) We do not view the company itself as the ultimate owner of our business assets but, instead, view the company as a conduit through which our shareholders own the assets.
- In line with this owner - orientation, our directors are all major shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway. In the case of at least four of the five, over 50% of family net worth is represented by holdings of Berkshire. We eat our own cooking.
- Our long - term economic goal (subject to some qualifications mentioned later) is to maximize the average annual rate of gain in intrinsic business value on a per - share basis. We do not measure the economic significance or performance of Berkshire by its size; we measure by per - share progress. We are certain that the rate of per - share progress will diminish in the future - a greatly enlarged capital base will see to that. But we will be disappointed if our rate does not exceed that of the average large American corporation.
- Our preference would be to reach this goal by directly owning a diversified group of businesses that generate cash and consistently earn above - average returns on capital. Our second choice is to own parts of similar businesses, attained primarily through purchases of marketable common stocks by our insurance subsidiaries. The price and availability of businesses and the need for insurance capital determine any given year’s capital allocation.
- Because of this two - pronged approach to business ownership and because of the limitations of conventional accounting, consolidated reported earnings may reveal relatively little about our true economic performance. Charlie and I, both as owners and managers, virtually ignore such consolidated numbers. However, we will also report to you the earnings of each major business we control, numbers we consider of great importance. These figures, along with other information we will supply about the individual businesses, should generally aid you in making judgments about them.
- Accounting consequences do not influence our operating or capital - allocation decisions. When acquisition costs are similar, we much prefer to purchase $2 of earnings that is not reportable by us under standard accounting principles than to purchase $1 of earnings that is reportable. This is precisely the choice that often faces us since entire businesses (whose earnings will be fully reportable) frequently sell at large premiums relative to small portions of similar businesses (whose earnings will be largely unreportable). In aggregate and over time, we expect the unreported earnings to be fully reflected in our intrinsic business value through capital gains.
- We will only do that which we believe we can explain to you in a manner that will enable you to assess the long - term consequences of our actions. Our intent is to handle our managerial job in a way that if you were to die or become incapacitated tomorrow, you would have no concerns about the management of your Berkshire assets. (And, if we do our job right, you should have no such concerns even if you outlive us.)
- We have no interest in using accounting gimmicks to inflate reported earnings. We will tell you the truth, good or bad. We have promised you that we will run Berkshire as if you owned 100% of it, sharing proportionately in its financial good and bad fortune, and we will be as candid with you in our reports as we would be if you were a private owner. Our goal is to give you - the owners - the information we would want if our positions were reversed.
- Although our primary goal is to maximize intrinsic business value, we also want to maximize the per - share market price of Berkshire stock relative to that value. We have two reasons for this: First, a higher stock price will enhance the financial flexibility of each of our shareholders. Second, we want shareholders to feel rewarded for their investment in Berkshire while they are our partners, not just when they decide to leave. Obviously, the relationship between market price and intrinsic value can be highly volatile, but we will do our best to keep the two in reasonable alignment. If we succeed, each Berkshire shareholder will benefit during his period of ownership to the extent that business value is enhanced.
- We will not split the stock. One of our goals is to have Berkshire Hathaway stock sell at a price rationally related to its intrinsic business value. (But note “rationally related”, not “identical”: if well - regarded companies are generally selling in the market at large discounts from value, Berkshire might well be priced similarly.) The key to a rational stock price is rational shareholders, both current and prospective. If the holders of a company’s stock and/or the prospective buyers attracted to it are prone to make irrational or emotion - based decisions, some pretty silly stock prices are going to appear periodically. Manic - depressive personalities produce manic - depressive valuations. Such aberrations may help us in buying and selling the stocks of other companies. But we think it is in both your interest and ours to minimize their occurrence in the market for Berkshire. We want those who think of themselves as business owners and invest in companies with the intention of staying a long time. And, we want those who keep their eyes focused on business results, not market prices. We believe that investors like this are few and far between, yet “probably over 95%” of our shareholders are long - term shareholders. Also, we are almost certainly the leader in the degree to which our shareholders think and act like owners. If we were to split the stock or take other action focusing on stock price rather than business value, we would attract an entering class of buyers inferior to the exiting class of sellers. Any investor preferring 100 shares at $13 per share over one share at $1300 would likely be an investor who buys for non - value reasons and is therefore likely to sell for non - value reasons and this, we predict, would accentuate erratic price swings unrelated to underlying business developments.
Finally, let’s move on to the highlights of 1983, the acquisition of a major interest in Nebraska Furniture Mart and our association with the Blumkin family. Mrs. B, with her vision and family considerations, finally decided to sell the company to us last year. I had admired this family and its business for decades, so the deal was quickly settled. But Mrs. B didn’t immediately go home to rest. As she put it, she didn’t lose her fighting spirit. Instead, she still serves as the company’s leader, staying at the store seven days a week. Selling carpets is her specialty, and she alone can outperform all other retailers.
We are delighted to have the Blumkin family as part of the Berkshire family and look forward to many years of successful operation under their leadership.
In summary, we believe that Berkshire is well - positioned for the future. We have a strong portfolio of businesses, a talented management team, and a group of shareholders who understand and support our long - term goals. We will continue to work hard to increase the intrinsic value of the company and to provide our shareholders with attractive returns.
Thank you for your continued support.
Warren E. Buffett
Chairman of the Board
Chairman of the Board
February 28, 1984
