巴菲特1996年致股东的信（英文版）

以下是 1996 年巴菲特致股东的信英文版全文：

Our gain in net worth during 1996 was $6.2 billion, or 36.1%. Per - share book value, however, grew by less, 31.8%, because the number of Berkshire shares increased: we issued stock in acquiring FlightSafety International and also sold new class B shares.

Over the last 32 years (that is, since present management took over), per - share book value has grown from $19 to $19,011, or at a rate of 23.8% compounded annually.

Each class B share has an economic interest equal to 1/30th of that possessed by a class A share, which is the new designation for the only stock that Berkshire had outstanding before May 1996. Throughout this report, we state all per - share figures in terms of "class A equivalents," which are the sum of the class A shares outstanding and 1/30th of the class B shares outstanding.

For technical reasons, we have restated our 1995 financial statements, a matter that requires me to present one of my less - than - thrilling explanations of accounting arcana. I'll make it brief. The restatement was required because Geico became a wholly - owned subsidiary of Berkshire on January 2, 1996, whereas it was previously classified as an investment. From an economic viewpoint - taking into account major tax efficiencies and other benefits we gained - the value of the 51% of Geico we owned at year - end 1995 increased significantly when we acquired the remaining 49% of the company two days later. Accounting rules applicable to this type of "step acquisition," however, required us to write down the value of our 51% at the time we moved to 100%. That writedown - which also, of course, reduced book value - amounted to $478.4 million.

As a result, we now carry our original 51% of Geico at a value that is both lower than its market value at the time we purchased the remaining 49% of the company and lower than the value at which we carry that 49% itself. There is an offset, however, to the reduction in book value I have just described: twice during 1996 we issued Berkshire shares at a premium to book value, first in May when we sold the B shares for cash and again in December when we used both A and B shares as part - payment for FlightSafety. In total, the three non - operational items affecting book value contributed less than one percentage point to our 31.8% per - share gain last year.

I dwell on this rise in per - share book value because it roughly indicates our economic progress during the year. But, as Charlie Munger, Berkshire's vice chairman, and I have repeatedly told you, what counts at Berkshire is intrinsic value, not book value. The last time you got that message from us was in the owner's manual, sent to you in June after we issued the class B shares. In that manual, we not only defined certain key terms - such as intrinsic value - but also set forth our economic principles. For many years, we have listed these principles in the front of our annual report, but in this report, on pages 58 to 67, we reproduce the entire owner's manual. In this letter, we will occasionally refer to the manual so that we can avoid repeating certain definitions and explanations. For example, if you wish to brush up on "intrinsic value," see pages 64 and 65.

Last year, for the first time, we supplied you with a table that Charlie and I believe will help anyone trying to estimate Berkshire's intrinsic value. In the updated version of that table, which follows, we trace two key indices of value. The first column lists our per - share ownership of investments (including cash and equivalents) and the second column shows our per - share operating earnings from our businesses, excluding interest and other carrying costs, but before income taxes and purchase - accounting adjustments. The second - column figure also excludes all dividends, interest, and capital gains from the investments included in the first column. In effect, if Berkshire were split into two parts, the figures in these columns would represent the operating results of the two segments.

We made two acquisitions in 1996, both possessing exactly the qualities we seek - excellent business economics and an outstanding manager.

The first acquisition was Kansas Bankers Surety (KBS), an insurance company whose name describes its specialty. The company, which does business in 22 states, has an extraordinary underwriting record, achieved through the efforts of Don Towle, an extraordinary manager. Don has developed first - hand relationships with hundreds of bankers and knows every detail of his operation. He thinks of himself as running a company that is "his," an attitude we treasure at Berkshire. Because of its relatively small size, we placed KBS with Wesco, our 80% - owned subsidiary, which has wanted to expand its insurance operations.

You might be interested in the carefully - crafted and sophisticated acquisition strategy that allowed Berkshire to nab this deal. Early in 1996 I was invited to the 40th birthday party of my nephew's wife, Jane Rogers. My taste for social events being low, I immediately, and in my standard, gracious way, began to invent reasons for skipping the event. The party planners then countered brilliantly by offering to have the CEO of KBS, Royce Yudkoff, send me the company's annual report. I had mentioned to some of my relatives at an earlier family gathering that I would like to look at the report of any small - cap insurance company that might be interesting. Sure enough, on February 12, I received a letter from Roy that said: "Dear Warren, Enclosed is a copy of the annual financial statements of Kansas Bankers Surety, the company we discussed at Jane's birthday party. Please let me know if you need anything else." The next day, I told Roy I would pay $75 million for the company, and before long the deal was done. I'm now thinking about going to Jane's next birthday party.

The second acquisition was FlightSafety International, a company that I had long been familiar with and whose business I understood well. I knew within 60 seconds of meeting Al Ueltschi, its CEO, that he was our kind of manager. We offered the sellers of FlightSafety a choice of cash or Berkshire stock, with the terms structured to gently nudge tax - paying sellers toward cash. As it turned out, 51% of the shares were exchanged for cash, 41% for Berkshire class A stock, and 8% for class B stock. We would have preferred to use only cash in the transaction, since we generally like to avoid issuing Berkshire shares. But we also wanted the FlightSafety sellers to get what they wanted, and we knew that a meaningful number of them had a strong preference for Berkshire stock.

In 1989, I decided to invest $358 million in USAir's 9.25% preferred stock. At that time, I liked and admired Ed Colodny, USAir's then - president, and I still do. However, my analysis of the airline industry was superficial and wrong. I was misled by the company's past profitability and overly confident in the protection our preferred stock provided. I overlooked the key fact that USAir's revenues were being hammered by intense price competition while its cost structure remained high, a legacy of the regulated - industry era. This cost structure was a ticking time bomb, and without significant changes to its labor contracts, the company was headed for trouble.

Sure enough, shortly after our investment, USAir's revenue - cost gap widened dramatically. From 1990 to 1994, the company lost $2.4 billion, nearly wiping out its common - stock equity. USAir continued to pay us our preferred dividends until 1994, when payments were suspended. In 1995, I offered to sell our shares at 50% of face value. Fortunately, I was unsuccessful.

In 1996, USAir began to turn around, and it paid us $47.9 million in back dividends, plus interest. We have now received a total of about $240.5 million in dividends from USAir (including $30 million received in 1997), and the current market price of USAir's common stock suggests that our preferred stock is worth close to its $358 - million par value. We owe a big thank - you to Stephen Wolf, USAir's current president, for getting the company back on its feet and paying us what it owed.

Last year we paid Solomon Brothers four times for services well - rendered. I've already described one of these transactions - the purchase of FlightSafety, for which Solomon served as our investment banker. The second was a financing arranged by Solomon for one of our finance subsidiaries.

In addition, through Solomon we completed two other transactions, both of which have interesting features. In May, we issued 517,500 class B shares, raising $565 million. I've previously discussed this offering, which was designed to counter the proliferation of Berkshire - look - alike funds. These funds, I believed, could easily raise large amounts of money by touting Berkshire's past performance. They would then plow the money into Berkshire's existing stock portfolio, potentially driving up the prices of our stocks and creating a bubble. This would attract more naive investors, leading to a vicious cycle. The class B shares provide a low - cost way for small investors to invest in Berkshire and, we hope, will dampen the enthusiasm for these imitation funds.

Overall, we tried to make sure that the B stock would be purchased only by investors with a long - term perspective. Those efforts were generally successful: Trading volume in the B shares immediately following the offering - a rough index of "flipping" - was far below the norm for a new issue. In the end we added about 40,000 shareholders, most of whom we believe both understand what they own and share our time horizons.

The art of investing in public companies successfully is not much different from the art of successfully acquiring subsidiaries. The goal is simply to acquire, at a sensible price, a business with excellent economics and able, honest management. Then, you need only monitor whether these qualities are being preserved.

Human nature and behavior do not change much. For instance, the reasons why people buy boxed chocolates from See's (a Berkshire holding) rather than from another company are "virtually unchanged from what they were in the 1920s when the See family was building the business." Moreover, these motivations are not likely to change over the next 20 years, or even 50.

One can, of course, pay too much for even the best of businesses. And this overpayment risk surfaces periodically. But if you stick to companies with good economics and able management, and if you avoid paying absurd prices, you should do well over time.

We believe that Berkshire's shareholders are best served when we focus on maximizing the long - term value of the business, rather than on short - term stock - market performance. By making smart acquisitions and managing our existing businesses well, we hope to increase Berkshire's intrinsic value over time. This, in turn, should benefit our shareholders, whether they sell their shares in the market or hold on to them for the long term.

Thank you for your continued support.

Sincerely,

Warren E. Buffett

Chairman of the Board